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ABSTRACT: It is well-known that taxes affect risky investment decisions. Analytical studies 
indicate that tax rate increases (decreases) can foster (hinder) investment if there is flexibility, in 
particular when an exit option is available. We design an experiment based on an analytical 
model with binomial random walk and entry and exit flexibility. Contrasting the underlying 
model, we find accelerated investment, which is often considered as an increased willingness to 
invest, on tax rate increases to be independent of the existence of an exit option. However, we 
observe this investor reaction only for a tax increase, not for a tax decrease. This behavior is 
driven possibly by tax salience and the mechanisms known from the theory of irreversible choice 
under uncertainty. Our empirical evidence suggests that the at-first-sight unexpected tax reform 
effects are more common than is predicted by the theoretical literature. Policy makers should 
therefore carefully consider the behavioral aspects when anticipating taxpayer reactions. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
There is an ongoing discussion among experts around the world on how to foster investment. 
This topic has gained relevance in the face of the economic downturn in many countries in the 
aftermath of the financial and the euro crisis. Because investments, particularly risky investments 
such as R&D investments, are crucial for economic growth and are sensitive to the economic 
environment, it is important to identify the drivers and obstacles for efficient investment activi-
ties. 
It is well known that taxes may significantly affect investment decisions (cf., e.g., Edgerton 
2010) and that risky investment projects are often asymmetrically affected by taxation (cf., e.g., 
Panteghini 2001a and 2001b; Niemann and Sureth 2004; Alvarez and Koskela 2008). We con-
tribute to the discussion on the tax effects on risky investments and study to what extent and un-
der what conditions taxes may distort risky investment decisions.  
The effect of taxes on investment decisions has been studied applying different approaches. In 
their seminal paper, Domar and Musgrave (1944) investigate the influence of taxation on risk-
taking in a portfolio decision framework. They find that loss offset provisions increase the inves-
tor’s propensity to increase the share of risky assets in portfolio decisions, particularly if tax rates 
are high. Stiglitz (1969), who extended this approach with respect to profitable investments, and 
subsequent studies identify the ambiguous effects of taxes on risk-taking. 
Against the background of these mixed results, another stream of literature emerged that focuses 
on the single investment decisions that are characterized by uncertainty, flexibility and (partial) 
irreversibility to clarify the puzzle. Here, investment decisions are reinterpreted as decisions on 
when to carry out a risky investment rather than on whether to invest. Several papers address this 
timing question, namely, to what extent taxes affect the decision on whether to invest immediate-
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ly or later when facing an entry or exit option. Using either continuous-time models with real 
options, i.e., contingent claims analysis or dynamic programming or discrete-time binomial 
models to capture the value of flexibility in the decision calculus, a critical investment threshold 
can be determined. Whereas under certainty it is well known that depreciation allowances, in-
vestment credits, loss offset restrictions, wealth taxes, and interest deduction barriers may cause 
so-called paradoxical effects, the analytical and numerical studies focused on uncertainty find 
higher taxes may stimulate investment even if the causes that are known from certainty do not 
exist (see Panteghini 2001a and 2001b; Gries, Prior, and Sureth 2012). These studies typically 
rely on real option theory (see Myers 1977; Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Trigeorgis 1996). In addi-
tion to the continuous-time models, binomial models have been applied and indicate that at first 
sight, unexpected investor reactions (acceleration upon tax rate increases and deceleration upon 
tax rate decreases) occur for specific classes of investment only if an exit option is available. 
Unfortunately, there is no suitable data on investment in the face of tax reforms for the archival 
studies. An empirical test is still missing.  
To close this research gap, we conduct an economic lab experiment. We study investors’ reac-
tions to tax reforms under timing flexibility and risk to determine whether the theoretically iden-
tified (tax reform- and exit flexibility-driven) reaction patterns can be observed in an experi-
mental setting and if so, how often.  
We find both at-first-sight unexpected investor reactions, the accelerating and decelerating tax 
reform effect. In contrast to the theoretical studies, we find the acceleration upon a tax rate in-
crease occur independently of the existence of an exit option. However, we observe this investor 
reaction more pronounced for a tax increase, while the presence of an exit option seems to be 
irrelevant for investment timing in the case of an experienced tax rate decrease. This asymmetric 
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behavior is driven possibly by tax salience (Ackermann, Fochmann, and Mihm 2013) and the 
mechanisms known from the theory of irreversible choice under uncertainty and prospect theory, 
whereby bad news affects investment decisions, while good news has a minimal effect or none at 
all (bad news principle, cf., e.g., Bernanke 1983; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; or Baumeister et 
al. 2001 for a more general view). Experimental studies provide first insights into the interactions 
of taxation, risk, and investment decisions. Yet, none of the existing studies to our knowledge 
provides evidence for the influence of tax rate changes on investment timing in the presence of 
risk as well as entry and exit flexibility. 
Our empirical evidence suggests that such at-first-sight, unexpected tax effects are much more 
common than can be predicted by the theoretical tax literature. This would imply that policy 
makers should not only rely on the findings from economics-based models but should deliberate-
ly discuss tax reforms and carefully consider the behavioral aspects when anticipating taxpayer 
reactions.  
We review the prior literature in section II. We introduce an analytical discrete-time model with 
binomial random walk and both an entry and exit option that is well known from the literature in 
section III. The framework for our experimental design is described in section IV. In section V, 
we discuss our results and find evidence for the previously only theoretically identified investor 
reactions, i.e., that tax rate increases can foster (accelerate) investment. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. PRIOR LITERATURE 
Whereas many studies are restricted to the numerical examples when identifying the paradoxical 
investor reactions, Panteghini (2001b) and Gries, Prior and Sureth (2012) demonstrate analytical-
ly in a real-option framework with an option to wait that uncertainty itself may cause paradoxical 
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reactions, i.e., accelerate investment on tax rate increases. Other analyses capture exit flexibility. 
Agliardi and Agliardi (2008 and 2009) employ a continuous-time real option model, which has 
been extended by Wong (2009), to investigate the impact of progressive taxation on entrepre-
neurial divestment decisions. The authors find a progressive tax schedule can foster or hinder 
closure policy in the case of loss-offset restrictions.  
Merging both types of options, simultaneous entry and exit flexibility are modeled by Schneider 
and Sureth (2010) and Niemann and Sureth (2013), who use binomial models. Schneider and 
Sureth (2010) find that an increased profit tax can foster investor willingness to invest in a pro-
ject with an abandonment option. While these studies do not focus on option values explicitly, 
they capture the value of flexibility. Niemann and Sureth (2013) identify the paradoxical effects 
on real investment timing under profit and capital gains taxation, whereas Alpert (2010) investi-
gates the timing of financial call options, demonstrating that taxes can be decisive for early exer-
cise.  
The aforementioned real option-type analytical studies indicate that accelerated investment as a 
reaction to tax rate increases may occur. In addition, the Domar-Musgrave studies indicate that 
taxation may increase risk-taking if a complete loss offset is possible. Obviously, the theoretical 
studies provide different explanations for tax rate increases to stimulate risky investments. Nev-
ertheless, both streams of literature identify the settings for opposite investor reactions to tax 
reforms. These mixed results call for an empirical test. An experimental study may help to gain 
evidence on whether the effects are sufficiently important to be accounted for in tax reform dis-
cussions. Our results can valuably contribute to the tax reform discussions, as such discussions 
are mainly characterized by simplified arguments such as those that claim that tax rate cuts are 
desirable to improve the investment environment. 
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There are only a few experimental tax studies that focus on the related research questions; for 
example, Rupert and Wright (1998), Rupert, Single, and Wright (2003), Boylan and Frischmann 
(2006), Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009), and Boylan (2013) study the impact of tax rate trans-
parency and salience on decisions and find that both properties matter. Furthermore, there are 
experiments on the effects of tax rate changes on taxpayer investment behavior. Swenson (1989) 
uses the Domar-Musgrave framework and compares the impact of different tax rules on both 
risky and riskless investments. His experiment indicates that proportional taxation does not sig-
nificantly increase risk-taking and hence supports only a portion of the prior theoretical findings. 
Furthermore, King and Wallin (1990) compare investment behavior under a proportional and a 
progressive tax to a benchmark case without taxation. They find that the progressive tax reduces 
risk-taking, whereas the proportional tax, as in Swenson (1989), does not lead to a significant 
increase in risk-taking compared to the benchmark. By contrast, Ackermann et al. (2013) find 
experimental evidence for a proportional income tax to decrease risk-taking in a Domar-
Musgrave type of setting. Anderson and Butler (1997) use an experimental setting to investigate 
the impact of capital gains taxes with different types of preferential taxation. Their study pro-
vides evidence for preferential taxation increasing risk-taking but also indicates that market ef-
fects can compensate for these distortions. In addition, Fochmann, Kiesewetter, and Sadrieh 
(2012) identify the ambiguous effects of loss-offset rules and risk attitude. Income taxation with 
complete loss deductions induces a sustained bias towards more risky investment decisions, 
while disaggregated income taxation and tax systems with no loss offset do not. In addition, Fal-
setta and Tuttle (2011) find behavioral investment reactions to taxes. They offer experimental 
evidence for the behavioral tax distortions in line with prospect theory in a setting where taxes 
affect the investments exempt from taxes via common mental accounts. 
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Recently, Falsetta, Rupert, and Wright (2013) identify timing as an important tax issue.4 They 
use an experiment to examine the effect of timing (gradual versus immediate) and the direction 
of capital gains tax changes on taxpayer preferences for investments in riskier assets. Their find-
ings support the expectations, suggesting that timing matters, i.e., the way in which a tax law 
change is implemented may impact decisions.  
The above-mentioned experimental studies provide evidence for the impact of taxes on risk-
taking and the effect of tax reform timing. Thus far, none of the available studies to our 
knowledge provides evidence on the influence of tax rate changes on both the investment timing 
and risk-taking under entry and exit flexibility. To fill this void, we perform an experiment on 
the effects of tax policy on investment timing under conditions of uncertainty and flexibility. 
 
III. THEORETICAL MODEL 
We model cash flow uncertainty using a binomial stochastic process to approximate the random 
walk (Alpert 2010; Schneider and Sureth 2010; Niemann and Sureth 2013). As the structure of 
the economic forces in the continuous-time models is very complex (Alvarez and Koskela 2008; 
Gries, Prior, and Sureth 2012), this simple stochastic process enables us to conduct an experi-
ment to determine whether the predicted (accelerating) tax reactions can be observed.5  
In the following, we assume a risk neutral investor who has an opportunity to invest in a non-
depreciable investment project (e.g., corporate stock or property) at either time t = 0 (determinis-
tic return) or time t = 1 (random return), similar to the model introduced by Schneider and Sureth 
(2010). Furthermore, the investor is assumed to be non-loss averse. As investors are typically 
                                                 
4 For experiments on options and timing in a tax-free setting cf., e.g., Lèvesque and Schade (2005); List and Haig 
(2010), 152-153. 
5 Cf. List and Haigh (2010), who also test an option setting experimentally and use a binomial model. 
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risk averse in reality, we discuss the relevance and possible limitations arising from the risk neu-
trality assumption later.  
In contrast to the real option models, this binomial approach does not explicitly capture the value 
of the option to wait, but rather the value of flexibility (Schneider and Sureth 2010, 163-164; 
Niemann and Sureth 2013, 376). Earnings are assumed to be completely distributed, so there are 
no capital gains (Schneider and Sureth 2010, 152-153). 
The risk-neutral investor bases his or her decision to invest either early or late in the relationship 
between the (expected) after-tax costs and benefits. Figure 1 illustrates the possible outcomes. 
 
Figure 1: Pre-tax binomial tree 
 
The investor can either invest immediately and earn the deterministic return given by the cash 
flow CF0 less initial outlay I0 with CF0 ≥ I0 (left side of the tree) or delay the investment and 
carry out the risky project at time t = 1 with an expected return of  (CF0 + γ)   I0 > 0 in the 
good state of the market or  (CF0  γ)   I0 < 0 in the bad state of the market, where  and  
are some exogenously given independent growth parameters (right side of the tree with or with-
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out exit option). Both states of the market are equally likely. The binomial tree is given in  
Figure 1. 
While the investment is a one-period project with initial outlay and instantaneous return, the time 
span of the investment problem ranges over two periods. Nevertheless, the timing preferences do 
not have to be considered because the decision on a postponement has to be made at time ݐ ൌ 0 
based on the expected values of the future cash flows. This model framework allows us to ab-
stract from the timing effects within each investment alternative.  
If the initial cash flow is sufficiently high, the investor will invest immediately; otherwise, the 
project will be postponed to wait for better conditions. At the same time, the investor will “park” 
the funds in the capital market at the risk-free pre-tax capital market rate of return r. We assume 
a tax system with a profit tax on income from real investment at a tax rate  and a final tax on 
interest income at rate f, which is common for many jurisdictions,6 and full and complete loss 
offset. As the tax base for the profit tax system is simply the cash flow, this tax system is similar 
to a sales tax.7 Moreover, interest payments are taxable or tax-deductible; thus, the after-tax rate 
of return is ݎఛ೑ ൌ ݎ൫1 െ ߬௙൯. 
The investor faces the following alternatives (Schneider and Sureth 2010, 155):  
(1) to invest immediately and receive the deterministic cash flow at t = 0 (invest now) or  
(2) to invest later and receive the stochastic cash flow at t = 1 (invest later without exit 
flexibility) or  
(3) to invest later and exercise the option to abandon (invest later with exit flexibility to 
abstain from delayed investment).  
                                                 
6 Many countries levy a final tax on interest income, e.g., Austria and Germany, similar to the Nordic countries that 
have a preferential tax rate for all types of capital income.  
7 Cf. Schneider and Sureth (2010), 154, who also explain that the initial outlay I0 can be considered as the initial 
effective net investment that implicitly captures the possible liquidation proceeds equal to the book value at time 
t = 1. 
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We obtain an after-tax decision tree as illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Post-tax binomial tree 
 
The investor has to make a decision that is characterized by two aspects. First, it is a timing deci-
sion (now or later) in line with real option theory; second, it is a risk-taking decision (certain 
cash flow or uncertain cash flow), which is often studied in the portfolio choice models. In line 
with the above-mentioned previous studies, we focus on the impact of the tax rate changes on 
investment timing and risk-taking. Because we do not focus on risk-taking exclusively, we can-
not apply a Domar-Musgrave-type model. Rather, we use the approach described above to study 
the tax effects in this more complex setting with both a timing and risk-taking decision. For rea-
sons of simplicity, in a first step we focus on the timing effect. Later, this proves to be an appro-
priate approach to our research question. When we discuss the results of our experiment, we will 
observe that investor attitudes towards risk, in contrast to the prior analytical studies, are not a 
driving force for the investment decision. By contrast, the investment timing seems to be crucial. 
Nevertheless, we take the riskiness involved in the decision as a ceteris paribus condition into 
account and will study its implications in detail.   
 10
The delayed investment, which yields an uncertain return, may be particularly attractive if the 
delayed investment offers the flexibility to react to future developments, i.e., if it includes an exit 
option (the EXIT scenario). In the underlying theoretical model, the accelerated (decelerated) 
investment behavior in response to tax rate increases (decreases) is possible in the EXIT scenario 
for ߙ ൏ 1 ൅ ݎఛ೑ and ߚ ൐ 2ቀ1 ൅ ݎఛ೑ቁ,8 whereas in this setting, in the absence of an exit option 
(LOCKED scenario), such tax effects cannot be found.  
Real-world examples for such settings are export-oriented industries such as the car manufactur-
ing industry and the oil-producing industry, for which the factor costs and revenues have to be 
calculated on the basis of different currencies. The differences in currencies may lead to different 
growth rates for the investment costs and revenues. For example, if a European car manufacturer 
sells products in the US while facing a weakening US dollar against the euro, the input prices are 
driven by the euro-based costs such that ߚ will exceed ߙ. Similarly, in the oil-producing coun-
tries, the costs are mainly based on the euro, while the revenues are US dollar-based.9 In addi-
tion, the R&D investments are likely to be characterized by these growth structures. Further-
more, the firms in financial distress after misinvestments or crises often have to decide on either 
investing in long-term high-risk R&D projects to keep up with their competitors in the future 
(risky future investment) or use scarce liquid funds to redeem loans and thus decrease their in-
solvency risk and simultaneously the risk premium in capital cost (the riskless immediate use of 
funds). Overall our setting with a risk-free and risky investment project can also be interpreted as 
decision on two alternative investments that are characterized by different degrees of risk expo-
sure. 
                                                 
8 See also Campbell, Chyz, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz (2013), who find evidence that a small subset of firms decreases 
investment upon the tax rate cut introduced by the 2003 Tax Act. 
9 Cf. Schneider and Sureth (2010), 156-165. 
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The present value of the expected after-tax profit from a delayed investment discounted to t = 0 
in the LOCKED scenario is given by10 
ாሾ௉෨భ	ሿ
ଵା௥ഓ೑
ൌ 0,5 ቈሺ1 െ ߬ሻ ఈଵା௥ഓ೑ ሺܥܨ଴ ൅ ߛሻ െ
ఉ
ଵା௥ഓ೑








Equating the after-tax return P0 from the immediate investment  
଴ܲ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻܥܨ଴ െ ܫ଴  (2) 
and from the delayed investment (eq. (1)) and solving for ܥܨ଴ leads to the so-called cash-flow 




ቑ	.  (3) 
The immediate investment is chosen whenever the observable cash flow CF0 is higher than the 
cut-off level. By contrast, for CF0 < CF0* the investment will be postponed.  
In the EXIT scenario, the second term in eq. (1) vanishes, and we obtain correspondingly  
ாሾ௉෨భ	ሿ
ଵା௥ഓ೑













                                                 
10 Cf. Schneider and Sureth (2010), 157, who provide more details on the real-world examples. 
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Prior analyses of the effects of a change in the tax rate  on the cut-off level in both cases and on 
the corresponding investor behavior clarify that an increasing tax rate always leads to the ex-
pected (delaying) tax effects under the given set of assumptions. By contrast, it may induce more 
early riskless investments when the project includes an exit option. This is often called the “par-
adoxical” tax effect and is also well-known from real option theory (Panteghini 2001a; Niemann 
and Sureth 2004; Alvarez and Koskela 2008; Gries, Prior, and Sureth 2012). This reaction, i.e., 
the accelerated risk-avoiding investment after a tax rate increase in the EXIT scenario, is usually 
not considered in the tax reform discussions.11 Obviously, introducing an option to abandon may 
cause such at-first-sight unexpected investor reactions, particularly if the tax rates are high.  
 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
Experimental Design 
The experiment follows a 2x2 design, whereby a treatment is characterized by a high or a low tax 
rate and the availability or non-availability of an exit option. To identify a clear influence of the 
tax rate on the timing of the investment and risk-taking, we choose either a low tax rate of 10 % 
or a high tax rate of 45 %. For each of these tax rates, there is either an option to abandon the real 
investment or no such option. Using this setting, finally, enables us to study the effect of an in-
crease in the tax rate on investor behavior depending on the existence of an exit option. 
As is standard in the related literature12, the experiment is framed in a business context. Specifi-
cally, the participants are told that they are the owners and managers of a small company. They 
                                                 
11 In a related framework, Domar and Musgrave (1944) find that high taxes are likely to increase the willingness to 
invest. 
12 Cf., for instance, Falsetta, Rupert, and Wright (2013), who study the effect of the timing of capital gains tax 
changes on risky investments; Fochmann et al. (2012), who investigate the impact of loss deductibility, and Kirchler 
and Maciejovsky (2001), who examine tax compliance. 
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have to decide how to invest the accrued reserves of 30,000 “Taler”, the experimental currency, 
from the annual surplus. This surplus results from other activities that are not related to the ex-
periment. While we abstract from the accrued reserves available for investment in the theoretical 
model, we need this assumption to create an experimental surrounding that excludes liquidity 
constraints from the investors’ decision context. 
The participants are offered two ways to invest the accrued reserves in the following two years. 
The real investment projects are mutually exclusive; in other words, it is not possible to split the 
investments between both alternatives.13 
Project A requires an immediate investment of 10,000 Taler and guarantees a return of 25,000 
Taler for the first year. For the second year, all assets will be invested as capital investments at a 
rate of return of 3.75 %. 
Project B requires delaying the investment to the second year. In the first year, a rate of return on 
capital market investments of 3.75 % is paid on the entire amount. In the second year, the real 
investment project requires an investment of 21,000 Taler. The return depends on how the mar-
ket develops in the second period.14 There is a 50 % probability that the market will develop 
well, and the real investment will generate a return of 52,290 Taler. There is a 50 % chance that 
the market will develop badly; in this case, the return is 22,410 Taler. 
In the low (high) tax treatments, the real investment returns are taxed at 10 (45) %. For simplici-
ty, the interest income is assumed to be tax-exempt. This assumption is equivalent to a final tax 
on interest income of 25 %, given a market rate of return of 5 % that has already been deducted 
                                                 
13 The full instructions of the experiment are included in the appendix. 
14 While the investment decision is framed as an intertemporal decision, the subjects make the decision within a 
short time span and are paid for all their decisions in the experiment at the end of the experimental session. Hence, 
the subjects do not face the opportunity to arbitrage between the lab and the field, and we do not have to account for 
the individual discount rates (Coller and Williams 1999).  
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implicitly in the rate of return on capital investment. Thus, the rate of return of 3.75 % can also 
be interpreted as the after-tax rate of return on capital investment, ݎఛ೑,	 in the theoretical model.  
In the treatments with the exit option (EXIT), the participants who choose to invest in project B 
may abandon the investment and retrieve the invested amount of 21,000 Taler after the state of 
the market (good or bad) becomes common knowledge. In the treatments without an exit option 
(LOCKED), the participants are bound by their decision. The participants are informed about the 
current tax rate and the availability of an exit option before making their choice.  
Accrued reserves R of 30,000 are available for the real or capital market investment. The remain-
ing parameters were chosen as follows:  
ܫ଴ = 10,000  
ܥܨ଴= 25,000 
 = 0.1 or 0.45   and  		௙ = 0.25 %, 
r = 0.05 and ݎఛ೑ ൌ 0.0375 
 = 1.494   and    = 2.1. 
Thereby, we exemplify the assumptions of the theoretical model, e.g., with respect to  and . 
This numerical example leads to the accelerating and simultaneously risk-avoiding tax effect 
known from the underlying theoretical model.  
In the LOCKED scenario, the investor will receive a future value of 
ܨ ௜ܸ௠௠௘ௗ௜௔௧௘,௅ை஼௄ா஽ ൌ ሾܴ െ ܫ଴ ൅ ܥܨ଴ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሿ ቀ1 ൅ ݎఛ೑ቁ (6) 
for the early investment and obtain 
ܨ෪ܸௗ௘௟௔௬௘ௗ,௅ை஼௄ா஽ ൌ ܴ ቀ1 ൅ ݎఛ೑ቁ െ ߚܫ଴ ൅ ߙܥܨ଴෪ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻ					with		ܥܨ଴෪ ൌ ሺܥܨ௨, ܥܨௗሻ	
																																																																																																																									ൌ ܥܨ଴ േ 10,000 (7) 
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in case of a postponement of the investment. Facing an exit option, the investor will receive cor-
respondingly 
ܨ ௜ܸ௠௠௘ௗ௜௔௧௘,ா௑ூ் ൌ ሾܴ െ ܫ଴ ൅ ܥܨ଴ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሿ ቀ1 ൅ ݎఛ೑ቁ (8) 
for the early investment and obtain 
ܨ෪ܸௗ௘௟௔௬௘ௗ,ா௑ூ் ൌ ቐ
ܴ ቀ1 ൅ ݎఛ೑ቁ െ ߚܫ଴ ൅ ߙܥܨ௨ሺ1 െ ߬ሻ																					for	a	good	state	of	nature
ܴ ቀ1 ൅ ݎఛ೑ቁ 																																																											for	a	bad	state	of	nature
  
with	ܥܨ௨ ൌ ܥܨ଴ ൅ 10,000	 	 ሺ9ሻ	
for the delayed investment. 
 





Figure 4: High tax 
 
 
In Figures 3 and 4, we observe for a low and a high tax rate that the chosen design of the experi-
ment allows us to build a setting that is in line with the framework and prediction provided by 
theory. Higher tax rates change the investment decision from a delayed risky to an early riskless 
investment. This experimental setting is appropriate to test for the predicted reactions to the tax 
reforms. The parameterization of the difference in the final payoff between the case with and 
without the exit option and between the immediate and the delayed investment is comparatively 
small. Hence, we consider our design as conservative in the sense that we will identify a lower 
bound of investment differences. If we can already identify the investment reactions for the small 
payoff differences, our results indicate that the timing and risk particularly seem to drive the in-
vestment behavior. The impact on the investment behavior will be even more pronounced with 




While in the low tax scenario (Figure 3) we find that immediate investment should be chosen in 
the LOCKED case, postponement will be preferred if an exit option is available. Assuming that 
the tax rate is increased from 10 % to 45 %, we observe an overall tendency to immediately carry 
out the investment project (Figure 4) regardless of whether the project incurs certain or risky 
cash flows. 
In this example, if the tax rate rises from 10 % to 45 %, in the EXIT scenario the investor will 
accelerate the investment and switch from postponement to immediate investment under the giv-
en set of assumptions and thereby avoid risk. Hence, the exit option and high tax rates favor in-
vestment acceleration. 
Whereas in the case of the low tax the investor will choose the late risky investment if an exit 
option is available, the high tax rate makes him or her accelerate the investment decision and 
avoid risk. Obviously, the numerical example supports the theoretical result that introducing an 
exit option may lead to investment acceleration if the growth parameters  and  meet the limita-
tions indicated by the model and the tax rates are sufficiently high. 
In summary, the predicted behavior of a risk-neutral wealth-maximizing rational decision maker 
is displayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Predicted investment decisions of experimental model 
 
 No exit option Exit option 
Low tax Immediate Delayed  
High tax Immediate  Immediate 
 
Focusing on the first step on timing, we obtain from these predictions the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1:  Given the availability of an exit option, high taxes in comparison to low taxes 
induce immediate investment. 
Hypothesis 2a:  A tax rate increase will lead to accelerated investments if an exit option is avail-
able. 




The experiment was conducted in November 2012 at the Business and Economic Research La-
boratory (BaER-Lab) at the University of Paderborn and was computerized using the software z-
Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The participants of the eight sessions were recruited using the online 
recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner 2004) and were only allowed to attend one of the sessions. In 
total, 208 subjects participated, most of whom were economics and business administration stu-
dents.15 Each subject had to make the investment decision for each of the four treatments to al-
low for analyses of the changes in tax regimes within subjects. 
 
Figure 5: Treatments 
 
 
                                                 
15 Table A1 in the appendix reports descriptive statistics for our sample. 
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We collect observations for each of the eight possible treatment sequences, which we call treat-
ment order groups (TOGs).16 This is important for our analysis in two ways. First, this approach 
enables us to control for the influence of order effects. Second, and more importantly, we can 
identify the effects of changes in the tax rate and the availability of the exit option within the 
subjects in both directions. The latter is important as Hypotheses 2a and 2b make statements 
about the changes in the tax rate. Table 2 displays the treatment sequences and the number of 
participants for each of the eight treatment order groups. In four sessions, the subjects were ran-
domly assigned to one of the treatment order groups designated by numerals one to four and in 
the other four sessions to one of the treatment order groups designated by numerals five to eight, 
as denoted in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Sequence of treatments and number of subjects by treatment order group (TOG) 
 
Treatment order group 
(TOG) 
Sequence No. of subjects 
1L↑E↑ LOCKED 10 – LOCKED 45 – EXIT 10 – EXIT 45 26 
2L↑E↓ LOCKED 10 – LOCKED 45 – EXIT 45 – EXIT 10 26 
3L↓E↑ LOCKED 45– LOCKED 10 – EXIT 10 – EXIT 45 25 
4L↓E↓ LOCKED 45 – LOCKED 10 – EXIT 45 – EXIT 10 23 
5E↑L↑ EXIT 10 – EXIT 45 - LOCKED 10 – LOCKED 45 28 
6E↑L↓ EXIT 10 – EXIT 45 - LOCKED 45 – LOCKED 10 28 
7E↓L↑ EXIT 45 – EXIT 10 - LOCKED 10 – LOCKED 45 26 
8E↓L↓ EXIT 45 – EXIT 10 - LOCKED 45 – LOCKED 10 26 
 
All subjects were seated in separate cubicles with a computer workplace. They had pen and pa-
per at their disposal throughout the experiment, received the same introductory talk and were 
told that communication would be prohibited during the experiment. Afterwards, the subjects 
                                                 
16 Indices at the single TOGs throughout the text indicate the treatment order. The first and second letter indicate if 
Exit (E) or Locked (L) was played during the first and the last two rounds, respectively, while the arrows indicate 
whether there was a tax increase from 10 to 45 % (↑) or a tax decrease from 45 to 10 % (↓) in the particular rounds.  
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received the instructions, and they were given time to read them thoroughly. 17 The net returns 
for both investments are presented on the screens throughout the experiment to avoid any bias 
due to the heterogeneity in subjects’ numeracy skills and the effects driven by the net wage illu-
sion (e.g., Fochmann, Weimann, Blaufus, Hundsdoerfer, and Kiesewetter 2013; Fochmann and 
Weimann 2013 and Djanali and Sheehan-Connor 2012). For each of the four decisions, the sub-
jects were endowed with 30,000 Taler. The earnings for each decision consisted of the amount of 
the endowment not invested, the return on investment after taxes in one of the years, and the in-
terest income in the other year. The earnings for one randomly selected treatment were paid out 
at the end of the experiment at an exchange rate of 1.75 EUR per 10,000 Taler. Each participant 
determined individually for which of the four treatments he or she would receive a payoff by 
rolling a four-sided die. In addition, all participants were paid a show-up fee of 2.50 EUR. After 
the experiment, the subjects were asked to answer a two-part questionnaire. Part one consisted of 
a lottery choice framework according to Dohmen et al. (2010) to elicit the subjects’ risk prefer-
ences.18 This part of the questionnaire was paid off for two randomly selected subjects in each 
session. Part two of the questionnaire contained questions regarding the subjects’ socio-
economic background, their course of study, their risk preferences, and their previous meaning-
ful serious experience with investments and taxes as well as questions regarding their decisions 
                                                 
17 We did not use control questions after reading aloud the instructions to prevent any kind of anchoring effect with-
in the limited decision set of the experiment. Even so, we are confident that the subjects understood the instructions, 
because of two reasons. First, student focus groups were used beforehand to rule out any incomprehensibility and 
inconsistency in the introductions; and second, the answers to questions in the second part of our questionnaire re-
garding the reasons for the subjects’ decisions do not exhibit signs of misinterpretation or misunderstanding of the 
instructions.  
18 Instructions for the lottery choice are provided in the appendix. In contrast to, e.g., Blaufus and Ortlieb (2009) 
who choose the method of lottery comparison in line with the Holt and Laury (2002) price list format – see also 
Lèvesque and Schade (2005), who measure risk preferences in case of timing decisions – we prefer the Dohmen et 
al. (2010) lottery choice framework to elicit risk preferences. We prefer this approach because Holt and Laury 
(2002) let subjects choose between two risky options, while Dohmen et al. (2010) let subjects choose between a safe 
and a risky option. The latter is closer to the experimental design of our main experiment.  
 21
during the experiment. Part two of the questionnaire was not incentivized. Each session lasted for 
approximately one hour, and the subjects earned 10.12 EUR on average. 
 
V. RESULTS 
The sample consists of 832 investment decisions because each of the 208 subjects decided in all 
four treatments. Out of these, 501 investments (60.22 %) were made in the first year, while the 
remaining 331 (39.78 %) were postponed to the second year. The investment decisions in the 
separate treatments in Table 3 indicate that this result is driven by the high tax treatments. When 
taxes are high, only 9.62 % (21.88 %) of the investments are carried out in the second year. The 
picture changes when taxes are low. Here, the minority of the investment activities were carried 
out in the first year, while the majority of 59.62 % (62.02 %) were postponed until the second 
year. 19  
Table 3: Percentage of delayed investments 
 
 No exit option Exit option 
Low tax 59.62 % 62.02 % 
High tax 9.62 % 21.88 % 
 
In both cases, the differences in investment behavior are significant regarding the tax height with 
the Fisher exact test yielding p-values < 0.0001.  
The existence of an exit option also seems to influence investment behavior. It appears as if giv-
en a constant tax rate, certain investments are postponed until the second year, resulting in a de-
crease in immediate investments when an exit option is available. However, Fisher's exact test 
indicates that this effect is only significant in the high tax case with a p-value < 0.0001. 
                                                 
19 These results are in line with Ackermann et al. (2013), who study the impact of taxes on risk-taking. 
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Table 3 indicates that taxpayers are likely to make delayed investments if taxes are low and they 
are locked in the investment once it has been carried out (59.62 %). In contrast to the other three 
quadrants, this result seems to be opposed to the theoretical and the numerical example. Howev-
er, it has to be noted that the results in this table do not provide evidence for the effect of a tax 
rate change but are limited to the effect of different tax-rate levels.  
To gain more detailed insights into the tax reform effects, in the next step logistic regressions, 
still focusing on the tax-rate level, were conducted. The dependent variable in all regressions is 
Invest Later, which equals one if the investment in the second year is chosen. Exit equals one if 
the exit option was available, and High Tax equals one if the tax rate was 45 %. Because each 
subject decided in all four treatments, the robust standard errors were clustered at the level of the 
individual. Table 4 exhibits the results of the logistic regressions. The first specification exhibits 
a high negative coefficient of -1.9 for High Tax that is significant at the 1 % level. If taxes are 
high, the probability of switching from the investment in year one to the investment in year two 
decreases. The tax effect is counteracted by the positive and highly significant coefficient of Exit, 
which indicates that the probability of a later investment increases if there is an option to aban-
don this investment. An interaction term between the two main explanatory variables is added in 
the second specification. While the coefficient of High Tax stays at its former level of signifi-
cance, the coefficient of Exit is no longer significant. Rather, the interaction term exhibits a high-
ly significant positive effect, indicating that high taxes and the availability of an exit option make 
a later investment more likely. This is contrary to the predictions of the model, which calls for an 









(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exit 0.534*** 0.101 0.085 0.110 (0.141) (0.182) (0.191) (0.197) 
High Tax -1.936*** -2.630*** -2.677*** -2.648*** (0.171) (0.283) (0.296) (0.306) 
Exit*High Tax  1.190*** 1.192*** 1.107***  (0.327) (0.340) (0.350) 
Controls   yes yes 
Risk Preferences    yes 
Constant 0.180 0.389*** 3.105*** 2.699*** (0.122) (0.142) (1.053) (1.030) 
Observations 832 832 816 784 
Pseudo R² 0.1531 0.1642 0.1832 0.1848 
Note: Estimates of logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at the individual level. The dependent variable Invest Later 
equals 1 if subject postponed the investment to the second year. Exit equals 1 
if subject exercise the exit option and High Tax equals one if the tax rate is 45 
percent. See text for more information on other independent variables included 
in the regressions. Significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
level is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
The third specification includes several control variables. In addition to the variables for the par-
ticipants’ gender and age, a dummy for the field of study, which equals one if the subject studied 
economics and management, and a control for the number of terms already completed are added. 
Dummies for attending courses in finance and investment, taxation, and banking are also used to 
control for the subjects’ specific knowledge. Finally, to control for the subjects’ experience with 
the tax system and risky investments, dummies for filing a tax return, having work experience in 
the fields of taxation or investment, following economic and financial policy news in the media, 
and having conducted a risky investment are used. As column (3) in Table 4 indicates, our for-
mer results are robust to the inclusion of the additional control variables.20 Finally, the last speci-
                                                 
20 Of these control variables, only the variables for age and the dummy for field of study, which are significant at the 
5 % and 10 % levels, respectively, have a negative impact on the probability of a late investment. The complete 
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fication of Table 4 controls for the subjects’ risk preferences because our underlying theoretical 
model assumes risk neutrality. With the inclusion of the risk preferences among the ceteris pari-
bus conditions, we are able to draw causal inferences of our treatment variations on the timing of 
investment. Using the subjects’ decisions in the Dohmen et al. (2010) lottery choices, we are able 
to classify the subjects’ risk preferences into four risk categories (risk averse, slightly risk averse, 
risk neutral and risk affine) according to their switching points. Subjects who switch within the 
first ten choices from lottery to safe payment were classified as risk averse, subjects with switch-
ing points from decision eleven to thirteen were classified as slightly risk averse, and subjects 
who switched from decision 14 to 16 and 16 to 20 were classified as risk neutral and risk affine, 
respectively.21 To test if our risk categories were correctly chosen, the maximum likelihood es-
timations were applied to the lottery choices to derive a parameter for relative risk aversion.22 
The estimations resulted in r-values of 0.5712 for the risk-averse, 0.3743 for the slightly risk-
averse, 0.0923 for the risk-neutral and -0.0807 for the risk-loving subjects. While the values for 
the first three categories are in line with the classification of Holt and Laury (2002), the value of 
-0.0887 is too high to qualify as risk loving according to their classification23 and are therefore 
treated as risk neutral in the following analysis. Surprisingly, the estimation results indicate only 
a small positive effect for the slightly risk-averse subjects. This effect is significant at the 10 % 
level, meaning that these subjects are more likely to invest later than their risk-averse peers. We 
do not find such an effect for the risk-neutral subjects. As demonstrated by the coefficients, con-
                                                                                                                                                             
regression tables are available from the authors upon request. A detailed list of control variables included in the 
regressions is depicted in Table A1 in the appendix. 
21 We omitted eight subjects with irrational decisions (more than one switching point for example) in this and further 
analyses that take risk preferences into account. 
22 Details on the estimation of the individual risk preferences are reported in the appendix. 
23 The range of the r-value in Holt and Laury (2002) is -0.49 < r < -0.15. 
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trolling for risk preferences does not have a significant influence on the effect of the tax level or 
on the interaction term. 
Additionally, the estimations were conducted with the classification of risk preferences accord-
ing to the switching points and with a classification according to Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey 
(2003), whereby the values of 0.5712 and 0.3743 qualify as risk averse, the value of 0.0922 as 
slightly risk averse and the value of -0.0807 as risk neutral. Again, there are positive significant 
effects at the 10 % level for the risk neutral in the Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey classification and 
positive significant effects at the 10 % and 5 % level for the slightly risk averse and the risk lov-
ing, respectively, in the switching-point classification. As previously, the effects of the high tax-
es and the interaction term are robust. For further robustness, the SOEP (2009) questions on risk 
attitudes concerning work and investment as well as on the overall risk attitude and the financial 
domain of the DOSPERT (Weber, Blais, and Betz 2002) from the second part of the experiments 
questionnaire were used as alternative and additional measures to control for the subjects’ risk 
preferences. Although the SOEP overall risk question and the gambling subdomain from the 
DOSPERT have a positive significant influence at the 5 % level when used instead of the lottery 
choices (so the more risk loving the subject, the higher the probability to switch from immediate 
to later investment), the main effects of High Tax and the interaction term remain highly signifi-
cant. Finally, the regressions of Table 4 were re-estimated using only those subjects studying 
management and economics. However, the main results remained the same. 24  
When looking at the investment timing in the four treatments in Table 5, we find that only in a 
situation with an exit option and a low tax rate do the risk preferences of the subjects have a sig-
nificant impact on investment timing at the 1 % level. In this case, it seems that risk-averse sub-
                                                 
24 Tables displaying the results of the robustness checks are available from the authors upon request. 
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jects tend to invest immediately, while slightly risk-averse and risk-neutral subjects choose the 
later investment.25 This result is in line with theory, which implies that risk-averse investors will 
have a higher preference for the risk-free alternative than less risk-averse investors. Surprisingly 
and in contrast to the findings of Ackermann et al. (2013), the risk attitude only loads if the tax 
rate is not salient (low tax rate).  
In the other three treatments, the chi-squared tests indicate that investment timing is not signifi-
cantly different with regard to the risk preferences. Nevertheless, to rule out the possibility that 
our findings are biased by the behavior of the risk-averse subjects, we exclude them from the 
following analysis.26  
 
Table 5: Chi-squared test of investment timing for different treatments across risk preferences 
 
 LOCKED 10 LOCKED 45 EXIT 10 EXIT 45 

















30 40 60 10 38 32 56 14 
42.86 % 57.14 % 85.71 % 14.29 % 54.29 % 45.71 % 80.00 % 20.00 % 
slightly 
risk averse 
32 42 69 5 24 50 50 24 
43.24 % 56.76 % 93.24 % 6.76 % 32.43 % 67.57 % 67.57 % 32.43 % 
risk  
neutral 
21 34 51 4 15 40 40 15 
38.18 % 61.82 % 92.73 % 7.27 % 27.27 % 72.73 % 72.73 % 27.27 % 
Chi² 0.39 2.82 11.42*** 2.86 
Note: Significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
In the next step, we focus on those participants that at least once changed their decision on the 
investment timing during the four treatments. Here, we still concentrate on the effect of the tax-
                                                 
25 This is confirmed when testing the three risk preferences in this treatment pairwise against each other. Then, the 
investment behavior of the slightly-averse (neutral) subjects is significantly different from the behavior of the risk-
averse subjects at the 5 % (1 %) level, while the investment decisions of the slightly-averse subjects do not signifi-
cantly differ from the decisions of the risk-neutral subjects.  
26 If we constrain our sample to the risk neutral individuals only, the number of observations is too low for a sound 
parametric analysis. Even so, the results of a re-estimation of Tables 6 to 8 limited to risk neutral subjects turn out 
similar to the results presented for the preferred sample. 
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rate level rather than the tax-rate changes but are able to draw a conclusion for the subgroup of 
participants that seems to be particularly sensitive in their investment behavior.  
The results of the estimations of the pooled conditional logistic models are reported in Table 6. 
Because of the fixed-effect character of these models, the values of the pseudo R² increase com-
pared to estimations (1) and (2) in Table 4, and the observations are reduced by the decisions of 
the subjects who did not change their decisions between treatments and of course the exclusion 
of the risk-averse subjects. As in the specifications above, the tax effect is predominant. Again, 
an added dummy for the high tax rate interacted with the availability of an exit option turns out 
to be positively significant – in contrast to the theoretical predictions – and even if it does not 
render the exit dummy insignificant as before, it suffers a loss of magnitude as well as signifi-
cance. Therefore, we have to reject hypothesis 1. Nevertheless, overall the subjects tend to invest 
immediately due to the predominant tax effect, which was not predicted by the theoretical model. 
 





Exit 1.013*** 0.555* (0.222) (0.287) 
High Tax -2.234*** -2.943*** (0.251) (0.423) 
Exit*High Tax  1.184**  (0.477) 
Observations 448 448 
Pseudo R² 0.374 0.391 
Note: Estimates of conditional logistic regressions. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable 
Invest Later equals 1 if the subject postponed the investment 
to the second year. Exit equals 1 if the subject exercised the 
exit option and High Tax equals one if the tax rate is 45 
percent. Significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 
1 percent level is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
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Our analysis thus far assumes that the impact of the availability of the exit option and changes in 
the tax system are independent of the order of treatments. The next steps in the analyses focus on 
the order effects and thereby use the full capacity of the rich experimental design. Furthermore, 
in contrast to the previous analyses, the treatment order groups (TOGs) allow us to draw conclu-
sions about the influence of the direction of the tax rate changes, i.e., whether the subjects exhibit 
a different investment behavior depending on the fact that they experience a tax increase versus a 
tax decrease. By this approach, we are able to investigate hypotheses 2a and 2b.  
The estimations are carried out for the different TOGs as indicated in Table 2. The results of the 
conditional logistic regressions for TOGs 3L↓E↑ to 6E↑L↓ and 8E↓L↓ are presented in Table 7. For 
the treatment order groups 1L↑E↑, 2L↑E↓ and 7E↓L↑, the estimations do not converge and thus are 
not reported in this table.27  
 




TOG 3L↓E↑ TOG 4L↓E↓ TOG 5E↑L↑ TOG 6 E↑L↓ TOG 8 E↓L↓ 
Exit -0.451 0.766 -0.000 -0.857 0.274 (0.816) (0.981) (0.778) (0.606) (0.851) 
High Tax -3.408** -2.558*** -2.367** -2.870** -2.106** (1.632) (0.986) (1.171) (1.200) (0.952) 
Exit*High Tax 1.984 0.481 0.813 2.110** 0.523 (1.906) (1.474) (0.877) (1.027) (1.262) 
Observations 48 64 52 36 56 
Pseudo R² 0.416 0.399 0.283 0.286 0.266 
Note: Estimates of conditional logistic regressions. TOG stands for treatment order group. Results for 
TOG 1L↑E↑, 2L↑E↓ and 7E↓L↑ are not reported because the estimation does not converge. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable Invest Later equals 1 if the subject postponed the 
investment to the second year. Exit equals 1 if the subject exercised the exit option and High Tax 
equals one if the tax rate is 45 percent. Significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level is 
denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
                                                 
27 This is most likely because in these TOGs, there is very little variation left between the different cells due to the 
small number of observations.  
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Reviewing Table 7, three things are obvious. Firstly, the effect of High Tax is, as before, nega-
tive, highly significant and consistent across all of the TOGs. Secondly, the positive slightly sig-
nificant effect of Exit from Table 6 cannot be found in any of the regressions in Table 7, and, 
thirdly, the interaction term is only significant for the TOG 6E↑L↓. Based on the results of the pre-
vious estimations, one would expect a positive significant influence of the Exit dummy and of 
the interaction term. The inconsistency demonstrates that for those effects, the order of treat-
ments plays an important role.  
The estimates for the treatment order groups 3L↓E↑, 4L↓E↓, 5E↑L↑, and 8E↓L↓ only exhibit the nega-
tive effect of the high tax rate but no further effects of the exit option or the interaction term. 
What three of these TOGs, i.e., TOGs 3L↓E↑, 4L↓E↓ and 8E↓L↓, as well as TOG 7E↓L↑, have in com-
mon is that the subjects have experienced a decrease in taxes within the first two rounds, inde-
pendently of the treatment (LOCKED or EXIT). This indicates that the initial experience of a tax 
cut renders the exit option useless. 
In the remaining TOG 6E↑L↓, the effects are close to those indicated by the regressions with the 
aggregate data. In this TOG, as well as in TOG 5E↑L↑, the subjects experienced an initial tax in-
crease with the availability of an exit option. Of course, the results again indicate the significant-
ly negative effect of high taxes, but now there is an additional significant and positive effect 
from the interaction between the exit option and high taxes in TOG 6E↑L↓. The latter effect is con-
trary to the predictions of the theoretical model. Although this effect cannot be found in TOG 
5E↑L↑, it seems that the presence of the exit option only positively affects the probability of in-
vesting later in the case of a tax increase. This becomes particularly clear when comparing TOGs 
6E↑L↓ and 8E↓L↓ because they only differ with respect to the experience of a tax increase in TOG 
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6E↑L↓ and a tax decrease in TOG 8E↓L↓ 28 The binomial tests conducted to back up the results 
above qualitatively exhibit the same results.29  
Next, we observe more closely the impact of a tax rate change. Whereas in the previous table all 
four decisions of each participant were included and we were only able to identify the tax-level 
effects, we now restrict the sample to those participants that changed their decision due to the tax 
rate increase during the course of the experiment (Panel I of Table 8).  
 
Table 8: Reactions in investment decisions to changes in tax rate 
 
Panel I: Reaction to increase in tax rate 
TOGs Exit  option 
No. of late in-
vestments when 




No. (%) of 




1L↑E↑ and 3L↓E↑ Available 26 76.47 % 20 (76.9 %) 0.000 
5E↑L↑ and 6E↑L↓ Available 15 51.72 % 11 (73.3 %) 0.000 
1L↑E↑ and 2L↑E↓ Not available 16 42.11 % 16 (100.0 %) 0.000 
5E↑L↑and 7E↓L↑ Not available 21 61.76 % 20 (95.2 %) 0.000 
  
Panel II: Reaction to decrease in tax rate 
TOGs Exit  option 
No. of early in-
vestments when 




No. (%) of 




2L↑E↓ and 4L↓E↓ Available 18 54.55 % 15 (83.3 %) 0.000 
7E↓L↑ and 8E↓L↓ Available 25 75.76 % 17 (68.0 %) 0.000 
3L↓E↑ and 4L↓E↓ Not available 26 89.66 % 21 (80.7%) 0.000 
6E↑L↓ and 8E↓L↓ Not available 24 85.71 % 14 (58.3 %) 0.000 
 
                                                 
28The results above are supported by the results of the full sample, including the risk-averse subjects. In this case, 
only the estimation for TOG 7E↓L↑ does not converge. The dominant effect of the high taxes is again significant in all 
TOGs. There is an additional significant positive effect of the exit option for TOGs 1L↑E↑ and 2L↑E↓, so it seems that 
the experience of an initial tax increase without the exit option leads decision makers to treat the availability of the 
exit option as an opportunity to postpone investment independently of the tax rate, at least when risk-averse subjects 
are also considered. The fact that subjects experience an increase in taxes seems to be the important element, be-
cause the effect does not occur when taxes decrease in TOGs 3L↓E↑ and 4L↓E↓. For TOG 5E↑L↑, an additional positive 
effect for the interaction is found to be comparable to that already found in TOG 6E↑L↓. Finally, in TOG 6E↑L↓ an 
additional slightly significant positive effect for the EXIT occurs, making the estimates for TOG 6E↑L↓ even more 
similar to the results of the pooled conditional logistic regressions. 
29 These are available from the authors upon request. 
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Given the predictions of our theoretical model, which indicate that a sufficient increase in the tax 
rate may cause investment acceleration, we are interested in the behavior of subjects who invest-
ed later when taxes were low. In contrast to the theoretical model, our experimental analysis was 
thus far restricted to the impact of the tax level regardless of whether the tax rate had been lower 
or higher in the previous round. The investment timing for late investors, which depends on the 
respective TOGs and is thus differentiated with respect to the tax rate increases and decreases, is 
displayed in Panel I of Table 8. For the treatments with an exit option, a rise in the tax rate takes 
place in TOGs 1L↑E↑, 3L↓E↑, 5E↑L↑ and 6E↑L↓. In TOGs 1L↑E↑ and 3L↓E↑, in which the tax rate rises 
from round 3 to 4, 26 subjects invested late in case of the low tax treatment. Twenty of these late 
investors switched to an early investment when the tax rates rose, and only 6 decided to stick to 
the late investment. In TOGs 5E↑L↑ and 6E↑L↓, in which the tax rate already increased between 
rounds 1 and 2, 15 subjects invested late when taxes were low. Eleven of the late investors 
changed their decision when taxes increased, and only 4 decided to stick to the late investment. 
In both cases, the change in investment behavior is significant according to Fisher's exact test at 
all conventional levels.  
To determine the extent to which this behavior is driven by the availability of the exit option, we 
analyze an increase in the tax rate in the LOCKED treatment in TOGs 1L↑E↑, 2L↑E↓, 5E↑L↑, and 
7E↓L↑. In TOGs 1L↑E↑ and 2L↑E↓, taxes rise between the first and second round. There, 16 subjects 
invested late when taxes were low, and all subjects invested early after the tax increase. In TOGs 
5E↑L↑ and 7E↓L↑, the participants faced a tax raise between rounds 3 and 4. Only one of the 21 
subjects who invested late when the tax rate was 10 % stuck to his or her decision when the tax 
rate increased to 45 %. The remaining 20 subjects changed to an early investment, which indi-
cates, as for the EXIT treatment, a significant change in behavior. Other factors seem to influ-
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ence the decision of investors in the treatment without the exit option when taxes are low. Only 
high taxes induce rational behavior on the side of the participants, which is characterized by im-
mediate investment in this case. An alternative explanation for the observed findings is that high 
taxes make the risk involved in the decision more salient (Ackermann et al. 2013). In line with 
their findings, we find the subjects invest immediately when taxes are high. This reaction might 
be driven by the bad news of high taxes, which seems to influence the investment decisions to-
ward an early riskless investment, while good news leave the investment behavior unaffected 
(Kahneman/Tversky 1979; Baumeister et al. 2001). The statements of the subjects that are col-
lected after the experiment support this interpretation (see below). In summary, these observa-
tions indicate that the tax effect dominates the effect of the availability of the exit option.  
The question arises whether we can observe a contrary effect, i.e., if subjects change their behav-
ior and postpone the investment rather than investing immediately after they experience a tax 
cut. The results are presented in Panel II of Table 8. It is obvious that the number of subjects who 
switched from an immediate investment when taxes were high to a later investment when the tax 
rate decreased is economically and statistically significant in all relevant TOGs.  
For a clean identification of the influence of the availability of the exit option on investment be-
havior, we compare the treatments with an increase in the tax rate that differ with respect to the 
presence of an exit option (TOGs 1L↑E↑ and 2L↑E↓ versus TOGs 5E↑L↑ and 6E↑L↓, Panel I of Table 
8) and the equivalent treatments with a decrease in the tax rate (TOGs 3L↓E↑ and 4L↓E↓ versus 
TOGs 7E↓L↑ and 8E↓L↓, Panel II of Table 8). We restrict our analysis to these TOGs because in 
these groups, the decisions of interest were made in the first two periods. Hence, no effects of the 
previous decisions have to be taken into account. We find evidence that the presence of an exit 
option influences the investment decisions in the case of an increase in the tax rate (p-value = 
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0.0434), according to Fisher's exact test. However, the effect is contrary to the one predicted by 
the theoretical model. The model predicts that an exit option leads to an early investment when 
taxes are high. However, as can be observed in Panel I of Table 8, only 11 of 15 possible sub-
jects (73.3 %) switch to an immediate investment when the exit option is present (TOGs 5E↑L↑ 
and 6E↑L↓), whereas all 16 subjects invest early when taxes are high and there is no opportunity to 
abandon the investment (TOGs 1L↑E↑ and 2L↑E↓). Therefore, in accordance with the results of the 
regression analysis, we have to reject hypothesis 2a. Regarding hypothesis 2b, Fisher's exact test 
indicates that there is no effect from the exit option when the tax rate decreases (p-value = 
0.2347), so this hypothesis must also be rejected. 
To shed light on the question as to why participants did not behave according to the predictions 
of the theoretical model, we consider the second part of the questionnaire. It seems that the main 
reason for observing such differences from our theoretical predictions lies in the fact that certain 
participants do not take both the taxation and the availability of an exit option into account. 
When asked “How did the tax level influence your decision?” approximately 59 % stated that 
their decision was influenced by the level of taxation, while 29 % stated that this was not the 
case. However, when asked “How did the option to abandon the delayed investment (investment 
B) influence your investment decision?” only 33 % stated that the exit option had an influence on 
their decision, while 47 % did not account for this option in their decision.30 The impression that 
the option did not affect the decision becomes even clearer when we consider certain individual 
answers. One subject stated: “To me, higher taxes mean that I need more security.” Another said, 
“I chose A when taxes were higher in order to not undercut a certain minimum gain.” This fixa-
tion on only one of the decision criteria led these subjects to choose the early investment when 
                                                 
30 The remaining answers to these two questions were inconclusive.  
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taxes were high and the delayed investment when taxes were low, which is again in line with the 
bad news principle. There is also anecdotal evidence for other elements that influenced the deci-
sions of the subjects. For example, one subject stated: “For a higher amount, I would have had to 
pay more taxes. I therefore chose the alternative in which I have to pay fewer taxes.” This im-
plies tax aversion as a driver.  
The individual perceptions of the situation might be another driver, because one subject stated: “I 
perceived the initial position of investment B as more profitable than that of A.” In summary, it 
seems that while some subjects clearly state that they use the expected payoff or both, the tax 
level and the availability of the exit option as the decision criteria, another segment of the sub-
jects tries to implement a simple rule of thumb or merely trust their guts to come to a decision.  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
It is well known that taxes may significantly affect investment decisions and that risky invest-
ment projects are often asymmetrically impacted by taxation. As risky projects are particularly 
important for future company performance and economic growth, it is important to determine to 
what extent and under what conditions taxes may distort risky investment decisions.  
The literature provides first insights into the interaction between taxes and investment timing 
under uncertainty and flexibility and theoretically identifies the conditions for earlier investment 
as a reaction to the tax rate increases. 
Using a rather simple experimental design, we study the investment reactions for different levels 
of tax rates. Corroborating the results of the underlying economics-based analytical model, an 
exit option in the case of a high tax rate seems to be the crucial setting for the accelerating tax 
effect. Concentrating on the impact of the tax rate changes, in the next step we find both the ac-
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celerating effect upon a tax rate increase and the decelerating effect upon a tax rate decrease. 
Moreover, we find evidence that higher taxes foster (accelerate) investment independent of the 
existence of an exit option. This is surprising and contrasts with the reactions predicted by the 
theoretical literature on the tax effects on investment timing under simultaneous entry and exit 
flexibility. High taxes seem to speed up investment. Contrary to the predictions from the theoret-
ical literature, our findings suggest that the presence of an exit option attenuates accelerated in-
vestments. However, we observe the latter only in the case of a tax increase, while the presence 
of an exit option seems to be irrelevant for the timing of investment in the case of a tax rate de-
crease. This investment behavior is possibly driven by tax salience and the mechanisms known 
from the theory of irreversible choice under uncertainty, whereby bad news affects investments 
decisions, while good news does not. 
Surprisingly, we find investor risk attitudes do not impact their behavior if the tax rates are high.  
Our empirical evidence suggests that at-first-sight unexpected tax effects, which are often called 
paradoxical investor reactions, are much more common than can be predicted by the economics-
based theoretical tax literature. By nature, these results are limited by the underlying set of as-
sumptions. As these assumptions include the specific growth patterns that are typical for R&D-
intensive and export-oriented industries, they provide important insights for the discussions on 
the interplay of taxation (tax rate changes, tax incentives) and economic growth. Our results im-
ply that tax rate changes often may not be likely to induce the intended investment effects. Thus, 
policy makers should generally be well aware of at-first-sight unexpected outcomes of tax re-
forms and carefully consider the behavioral aspects that might invoke unexpected reactions of 
the taxpayers that are often neglected.   
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Instructions (The original instructions were in German) 
 
For the course of the experiment, all amounts of money will be stated in the fictive currency “Ta-
ler”. 
The experiment consists of 4 periods. After the first 2 periods, you will receive further instruc-
tions for the remaining 2 periods. 
Your payment is in no stage of the experiment dependent on the decisions of the other partici-
pants. Furthermore, the payout of one period does not affect the payout of any other period; the 
results of all the periods are independent of one another.  
At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to throw a die to determine which one of the 4 
periods is relevant for payment. The result of this period will then be paid out to you. 
After the experiment has finished, you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire. You will receive 
a short set of instructions as soon as the experiment has ended. The answers in this questionnaire 




Procedure of a Period 
As the owner and manager of a small company, you have accumulated reserves of 30,000 Talers 
from the annual surplus that are available for investment. The investment horizon is 2 years. 
Having been well-advised and after thorough consideration of all alternatives, you have identi-





Investment A: You invest immediately. 
 
In the first year, you invest 10,000 Talers and 
achieve earnings of 25,000 Talers, which are 
taxed at the current tax rate. 
 
In the second year, your whole credit balance 
is tied up and yields interest at a rate of 
3.75 %.   
Investment B: You invest later.  
 
In the first year, your whole credit balance is 
tied up and yields interest at a rate of 3.75 %. 
 
 
In the second year, you invest 21,000 Talers. 
The revenue of this investment depends on 
the market situation. With a positive devel-
opment, you achieve earnings of 52,290 Ta-
lers, and with a negative development, you 
achieve earnings of 22,410 Talers. The posi-
tive and negative developments are equally 
probable, which means that in half the cases 
the market situation improves, and in the 
other half of the cases, the market situation 
worsens. The revenue is then taxed at the 
current tax rate. 
 
After you have learned how the market situa-
tion has developed, you have the option to 
abort the investment. Thus, you receive a 
redemption of the invested amount of 21,000 
Talers, and your final credit balance amounts 
to 31,125 Talers.  
Tax Payment 
You must pay taxes for all revenues that were generated from investment activities. The taxes are 
deducted from the achieved revenue directly after the investment has been undertaken. At the 
beginning of each period, the current tax rate will be communicated. You do not have to pay any 
taxes on the interest income.  
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Result for one Period 
The result for one period consists of the part of the reserves that were not invested, the invested 
sum (after the deduction of taxes) in one of the years, and the interest income in the other year. 
 
Payout 
At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to throw a die to determine which one of the 4 
periods is relevant for your payout. The result of this period will then be exchanged at an ex-
change rate of 1.75 Euro per 10,000 Talers. A show-up fee of 2.50 Euro is added to this amount, 
which is then directly paid out to you in cash. 
 
Please note: 
During the entire experiment, no form of communication is permitted. 
All mobile phones must be switched off during the complete duration of the experiment. 
The decisions you make within this experiment are anonymous, i.e., none of the other partici-
pants learns about the identity of a person who has made a specific decision. 
The payments are also handled anonymously. No other participant finds out how much money 
the other participants have earned and have been paid out. 
Please remain seated until the end of the experiment. You will be called forward for your payout 
through your seat number. 
 
Good luck, and thank you for your participation in this experiment! 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics of control variables  
 
 obs percent* min max 
female 208 50.96 0 1 
age* 208 22.94 18 35 
study 208 81.64 0 1 
sem* 208 4.28 0 11 
study finance 207 57.00 0 1 
good finance 111 65.77 0 1 
study tax 208 50.96 0 1 
good tax 98 55.10 0 1 
study bank 207 15.94 0 1 
good bank 35 65.71 0 1 
work invest 208 22.12 0 1 
work tax 208 27.88 0 1 
risky invest 208 32.69 0 1 
informed 208 48.56 0 1 
tax declaration 208 35.58 0 1 
Note: For variables denoted by * the mean is given instead of percent. female 
equals 1 if subject is female, age measures the age of subject in years, study 
equals 1 if subject studies economics and management and sem measures the 
number of terms already completed. study finance, study tax and study bank 
equal 1 if subjects attended courses in the areas of finance and investment, 
taxation and banking, respectively. good finance, good tax and good bank 
equal 1 if subjects rate themselves as being good in these courses. work invest 
and work tax equal 1 if subjects have work experience in the fields of invest-
ment or taxation. risky invest equals 1 if subjects have already conducted a 
risky investment, informed equals 1 if subjects follow economic and financial 
policy news in the media and tax declaration equals 1 if they have filed a tax 






 The experiment is over now. The Questionnaire follows. 
Instructions questionnaire part 1 
 In part 1 of the questionnaire, we would like to know how you would choose between a 
safe payment (Alternative A) and a lottery (Alternative B). 
 The following screen will be presented to you: 
 
Please state for each row if you prefer the safe payment (alternative A) OR the lottery (alternative B): 
1) Alternative A: €0 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
2) Alternative A: €1 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
3) Alternative A: €2 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
4) Alternative A: €3 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
5) Alternative A: €4 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
6) Alternative A: €5 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
7) Alternative A: €6 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
8) Alternative A: €7 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
9) Alternative A: €8 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
10) Alternative A: €9 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
11) Alternative A: €10 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
12) Alternative A: €11 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
13) Alternative A: €12 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
14) Alternative A: €13 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
15) Alternative A: €14 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
16) Alternative A: €15 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
17) Alternative A: €16 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
18) Alternative A: €17 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
19) Alternative A: €18 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
20) Alternative A: €19 for sure   Alternative B: with 50 % chance €30 and with 50 % chance €0 
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 In each line (from 1 to 20), you have two options: 
o A fixed payment you get for sure (Alternative A). 
o An “all-or-nothing” lottery in which you win 30 Euro with a probability of 50 % 
and win nothing with a probability of 50 % (Alternative B). 
 Please choose for each line either alternative A or B. Mark the left field if you choose Al-
ternative A or the right field if you choose Alternative B. 
Additional profit opportunity in part I of the questionnaire: 
 In this first part of the questionnaire, you have another chance to earn a payment. 
 For this additional chance, two participants in this room will be randomly drawn. 
 For the drawing of the two winners, two cabin numbers will be randomly drawn out of an 
urn. 
 The chosen participants will receive their additional payout when all payoffs are distrib-
uted after answering the second part of the questionnaire. 
 If you are one of the two chosen participants, you will be asked to cast a twenty-sided 
die. 
 With the first cast of the twenty-sided die, you decide which line will be relevant for your 
payment. 
 If you decided to take Alternative B for the line that will be paid out, you will be asked to 
cast a twenty-sided die again. With the numbers 1 to 10, you receive 30 Euro, with 11 to 
20 you receive nothing. If you decided to take Alternative A, you will receive the safe 
payout immediately. 
When all participants complete the first part of the questionnaire, the second part will follow.  
The answers in the second part of the questionnaire are irrelevant for the payout. 
Please keep in mind that all questions will be evaluated anonymously and communication is not 
allowed during the complete experiment. 
 





Estimation of individual risk preferences 
To derive the risk preferences of the subjects from their lottery choices, we follow Holt and 
Laury (2002) and Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2003). An additive random utility model (ARUM) 
is used (Cameron and Trivedi 2005) to derive the choice probabilities, from which the corre-
sponding coefficients are determined. In detail, the subjects choose the option with the higher 
utility between the safe option A and the lottery option B. If the subjects choose the safe option 
A, they earn the safe payout S with the utility Us. The subjects choosing the lottery option B earn 
the expected payoff L with the utility UL. Then, the ARUM specifies the utilities of the two op-
tions as 
ௌܷ ൌ ௌܸ ൅ ߝௌ 
ܷ௅ ൌ ௅ܸ ൅ ߝ௅ ൌ 0,5 ൈ ܸሺ30ሻ ൅ 0,5 ൈ ܸሺ0ሻ ൅ ߝ௅ 
where VS and VL are the deterministic components of utility, and ߝௌ and ߝ௅ are the random com-
ponents of utility. Let y denote the actual decision of the subject. If US > UL, the subject chooses 
the safe option, and y=1. For this case, the probability of a subject to choose the safe option is 
      Prሾݕ ൌ 1ሿ  ൌ Prሾ ௌܷ ൐ ௅ܷሿ 
ൌ Prሾ ௌܸ ൅ ߝௌ ൐ ௅ܸ ൅ ߝ௅ሿ 
ൌ Prሾߝ௅ െ ߝௌ ൏ ௌܸ െ ௅ܸሿ 
ൌ ܨሺ ௌܸ െ ௅ܸሻ 
where F is the cumulative distribution function of (ߝ௅ െ ߝௌ).  
 
Following Luce (1959), a noise parameter ߣ is introduced to allow for the subjects making mis-
takes when filling out the choice table, which could be evoked by insensitivity in the payoff dif-
ferences. Then, the probability of choosing the safe option can be written as 
Prሾݕ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ ଵଵାୣ୶୮	ሺఒൈሺ௏ಽି௏ೄሻሻ . 
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Because the noise parameter is contrarily related to the variance of the error terms, the smaller 
values of ߣ result in a choice probability of 0.5 and the large values of ߣ in a decision for the safe 
option A. 
As utility function with a constant relative risk aversion  
ܷሺݔሻ ൌ ݔଵି௥ 




to prevent scaling effects on ߣ. Thereby, the utility can only take values between 0 for the lowest 
possible payoff of zero and 1 for the highest possible payoff of 30 Taler. Because the normalized 
utility of the lottery option B equals 0.5, the probability of choosing the safe option simplifies to  




Finally, all choices of all subjects were used simultaneously to estimate the r coefficients and the 
noise parameter ߣ using maximum likelihood estimations.  
 
